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INTERNET PUBLICATIONS AND 
DEFAMATION: WHY THE SINGLE 
PUBLICATION RULE SHOULD NOT 
APPLY 
Defamation is broadly defined as any communication that 
"tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in 
the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him."! A defamation action must 
establish four essential elements: falsity, an unprivileged 
communication, fault and damages.2 
Traditional defamation law sought to restore a defamed 
individual's dignity and worth by vindicating the individual's 
sullied reputation in a public forum and by exacting 
compensation from the defamer.3 In 1966, Justice Stewart 
characterized the values underlying traditional defamation law 
as "reflecting no more than our basic concept of the essential 
dignity and worth of every human being - a concept at the root 
of any decent system of ordered liberty."4 
At common law, each communication of a defamatory 
statement to a third person constituted a new publication, 
which gave rise to a cause of action.5 In response to the 
multiple claims resulting from mass media publications, many 
states adopted a Uniform Single Publication Act or rule, either 
by statute or case law, limiting damages for libel or slander 
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
2 Mark v. Seattle Times, 486, 635 P.2d 1081 (1981). 
3 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1973). 
4 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 58. See also Spears Free Clinic & Hospital 
for Poor Children v. Majer, 271 P.2d 489 (1953); Schneider v. United Airlines, Inc., 208 
Cal. App. 3d 71 (1989). 
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based on any single "aggregate" publication to one cause of 
action.6 
However, even in states that follow the Uniform Single 
Publication Act, reprinting or republication in another form 
constitutes a new cause of action.7 In Kanerak v. Bugliosi, an 
allegedly libelous book that was republished in paperback 
form, although identical in form and content to the earlier 
hardcover edition, was intended to and did reach a new group 
of readers, and therefore constituted the basis for a new cause 
of action.8 
The Second Restatement of Torts states that the single 
publication rule does not include separate aggregate 
publications on different occasions.9 In these cases, if the 
publication reaches a new group, the repetition justifies a new 
cause of action.1° The originator of defamatory matter may be 
liable for each "repetition" of the defamatory matter by a 
second party "if he could reasonably have foreseen the 
repetition."ll 
I. DEFAMATION ON THE INTERNET 
Republication on the Internet, however, requires an 
entirely different approach. According to the court in ACLU v. 
Reno, "The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but 
6 New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-7-1); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
651 (1982»; California (CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 3425.3 (Deering 1984». 
No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or 
slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single 
publication or exhibition or utterance, such as anyone issue of a newspaper or 
book or magazine or anyone presentation to an audience or anyone broadcast 
over radio or television or anyone exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any 
action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all 
jurisdictions. 
Id.; Idaho (IDAHO CODE §§ 7-702 to 7-705 (1979»; Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 126, pp. 
11 to 15 (Smith-Hurd 1987»; New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-7-1 to 41-7-5 (1986»; 
North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE 14-02-10 (1987»; Pennsylvania (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 8341 Notes (West Supp.1994»; Florida (FLA. STAT. § 770.06 (1987»; Nebraska 
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-209 (1983»; Gregoire v. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E. 
2d 45; Applewhite v. Memphis State University., 495 S.w. 2d 190 (Tenn. 1973); 
Holloway v. Butler, 662 S.W. 2d 688,689 (Tex. Ct. App.1983). 
7 Kanarek v. BugJiosi, 108 Cal. App. 3d, 327, 332 (1980). 
8 Id. 
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A. 
10 Id. 
11 McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 795, 797 (1980); See 
also Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 281 (1984). 
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rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable 
smaller groups of linked computer networks."12 In 1996, over 
9.4 million computers were linked to the Internet, 60 percent of 
which were located in the United States.13 This does not 
include personal computers using modems to access the 
Internet. 14 Reasonable estimates are that as many as 40 
million people can and do access the Internet; that figure was 
expected to grow to 200 million Internet users by 1999.15 
Today, home Internet use in the United States alone is 
estimated at 165.2 million people. Globally, over 259 million 
people currently have the ability to access the Internet in their 
homes.16 
This vast use of the Internet changes the scope of harm 
associated with defamation. Communications on the Internet 
are more pervasive than print. For this reason, they have 
tremendous power to damage a person's reputationP Once a 
message enters cyberspace, millions of people worldwide can 
gain access to it. Any posted message or report can be 
republished by printing, or more commonly, by forwarding it 
instantly to a different location, leading to potentially endless 
replication. The power to defame others over the Internet is 
extraordinary.18 As stated by the court in ACLU u. Reno: 
When information is made available, it is said to be 
'published' on the Web.19 ••• Publishing on the Web simply 
requires that the publisher, has a computer and access to the 
Internet .... 2o ••• Once a provider posts content on the Internet, 
it is available to all other Internet users worldwide ... Internet 
technology gives a speaker a potential worldwide audience.21 
12 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830. Affmd. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
13 Id. at 871. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 NielsenINetRatings Website, July Internet Universe (visited January 6, 2002) 
<http://www.nielsen-netratings.comlhocoCthe_net_Lhtm.> 
17 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in 
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 864 (2000). 
18 Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The 
First Amendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1154 (1996). 
19 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 at 837. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 844. 
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II. REPUBLICATION ON THE INTERNET 
Few cases have addressed the issue of republication of 
defamatory material on the Internet. In the case of Firth v. 
State, the plaintiff, the Director of the Division of Law 
Enforcement for the Department of Environmental 
Conservation in New York, filed a claim against the State of 
New York and its officers for publication of a defamatory report 
regarding his management of the office.22 The plaintiff had 
served as director of the office for 13 years, and had been 
investigated because of a "whistleblower" complaint to the 
State Inspector General, which resulted in a defamatory report 
being issued by the State.23 The plaintiff maintained that he 
was defamed by the report, both at the time of initial 
publication and thereafter through daily republication on the 
Internet.24 The plaintiff argued that he suffered from a 
continuing injury to his reputation, and that each day that the 
article was available on the Internet constituted a new 
publication triggering a new accrual date.25 
The court agreed that the initial publication on the 
Internet was a new "publication" for the purpose of defamation 
and agreed that a republication will occur when the defamatory 
article is placed in a new form, such as paperback as opposed to 
hardcover, or edited in a different manner. 26 Therefore, 
publication on the Internet was a republication of the written 
report.27 
The court next considered the issue of whether each 
appearance of the report upon the Internet constituted a 
republication. The trial court determined that the single 
publication rule applied to newspapers 28 and books 29 should 
be extended to the Internet. 
Further, the court analogized that, in the case of a book, 
the date of publication is the date it is first sold to the public.30 
22 Firth v. State, 2000 WL 306865 (2000). 
23 Id. at 2. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 6. 
26 Rinaldi v. Viking Penquin, 420 N.E.2d 377, 381-384 (1981). 
27 Firth, 2000 WL 306865 at 6-7. 
28 Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 18 N.E. 2d 767 (1939). 
29 Gregoire v. Putnam's Sons, 119, 81 N.E. 2d 45 (1948). 
30 Firth, 2000 WL 306865 at 6. 
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Therefore, on the Internet the date of publication is the date it 
first appears on the Internet. The court further analogized 
that, just as sales of the book did not constitute republication, 
"hits" viewed as the equivalent of book sales on the Internet 
also did not constitute republication.31 The court concluded 
that each daily appearance of the report on the Internet did not 
constitute a republication triggering a new cause of action, or 
extend the statute of limitations.32 
In Van BusKirk u. N. Y. Times Co., a subsequent New York 
trial court case that followed Firth's reasoning, plaintiff filed a 
claim for defamation based on a letter written by defendant 
that was posted on a New York Times opinion page on the 
Internet.33 The plaintiff claimed that the letter was 
republished daily, and that the statute of limitations period 
therefore began every day that the letter remained on the 
Internet. The New York trial court followed Firth in applying 
the single publication rule to the Internet.34 
The plaintiff argued that Internet publishers should not be 
protected by the single publication rule because, unlike book or 
newspaper publishers, the Internet publisher can withdraw the 
material at any time.35 The plaintiff asserted that the 
defendant made a "conscious decision every minute of every 
day not to remove the letter."36 The court disagreed, holding 
that a publisher's sale of a book from stock did not constitute a 
republication, even though it too could have been withdrawn.37 
In the only state Court of Appeals case to address the issue 
of republication on the Internet, a Tennessee Court of Appeals 
in Swafford u. Memphis held that the single publication rule 
should not apply to multiple reports issued from a database 
accessed on the Internet.38 In Swafford, the plaintiff, a 
physician, alleged defamation based on a report stored in the 
National Practitioner Data Bank, which was accessed by 
31 Id. at 6. 
32 Id. 
33 Van BusKirk v. N.Y. Times Co., 2000 WL 1206732 (2000). 
34 Id. 
35 Van BusKirk, 2000 WL 1206732 at 2. 
36 Id. at 2. 
37 Van BusKirk, 2000 WL 1206732 at 2. 
38 Swafford v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass'n., WL 281935 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1998), 
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health care agencies on several occasions. In reaching its 
decision, the court relied on two theories.39 
First, the court recognized that publication of anyone 
edition of a book or newspaper, anyone radio or television 
broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture, or similar aggregate 
communication is recognized under the single publication rule 
as a single publication.40 However, the court noted that the 
single publication rule does not apply to "aggregate 
publications on different occasions." The Restatement 
explains: 
If the same defamatory statement is published in the morning 
and evening editions of a newspaper, each edition is a 
separate single publication and there are two causes of action. 
The same is true of a rebroadcast of the defamation over radio 
or television or second run of a motion picture on the same 
evening. In these cases the publication reaches a new group, 
and the repetition justifies a new cause of action. The 
justification for this conclusion usually offered is that in these 
cases the second publication is intended to and does reach a 
new groUp.41 
The defendants argued that the Data Bank is openly 
accessible to the public and, therefore "is akin to the circulation 
of copies of an edition of a book, newspaper, or periodical."42 
The plaintiff argued that the single publication rule is 
inapplicable, and that the injury does not occur until the 
information stored in the Data Bank is requested and retrieved 
by others.43 The court agreed with the plaintiff that each 
access of the Internet database was an additional "aggregate" 
publication.44 
Second, the court acknowledged that this was an issue of 
first impression, and, as of the filing of the opinion, no reported 
cases addressed the statute of limitations in the context of 
defamation on the Internet.45 Because of analogous facts, such 
as retrieval of information from databanks, the court looked to 
39 [d. at 4. 
40 Swafford, WL 281935 at 6 [quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A (3)]. 
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A cmt. D. 
42 Swafford, WL 281935 at 5. 
43 [d. 
44 [d. 
46 Swafford, WL 281935 at 6. 
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causes of action that arose out of allegedly defamatory credit 
report statements.46 
In Hyde u. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, the plaintiff claimed that 
the defendant bank had submitted to the defendant credit-
reporting agency an erroneous statement that the plaintiff had 
failed to pay a debt.47 Three years later, a credit card company 
rejected the plaintiffs application for a credit card. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that liability arose on the date 
that credit was denied to the consumer, not the date that the 
report was submitted to the reporting agency because that was 
the date on which injury was inflicted.48 
In a similar defamatory credit report case involving 
accessing and reporting from a database, the California Court 
of Appeals in Scheneider u. United Airlines, Inc., held that 
"where republication reaches a new entity or person, repetition 
justifies a new cause of action."49 The court held that even 
though the credit-reporting agency had previously published 
the report to one its customers, its dissemination to a second 
customer was a separate publication and new cause of action.50 
This analogy has merit. The Internet may be likened to a 
vast publicly accessible database. The information is 
potentially always accessible. It is always available to cause 
new harm, if harmful information is placed on it. Information 
is placed on the Internet with the intention that it will be 
available to reach new audiences over time. Echoing the words 
of the Second Restatement, the Internet "is intended to and 
does reach a new groUp."51 This is not true with the print 
media, which has a dramatic impact, but quickly fades away 
over time. The Internet is more like a television, radio, or 
motion picture exhibition, which gives material a renewed 
impact each time it is broadcast, or each time the defamatory 
material is accessed. This repeat impact justifies its exclusion 
from the single publication rule. 
The Second Restatement of Torts enforces the idea that 
different communications are different publications. According 
46 Id. 
47 Hyde v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 861 F. 2d 446, 447 (5th Cir. 1988). 
48 Id. at 446. 
49 Scheneider v. United Airlines, Inc., 208 Cal. App. 3d 71, 75 (1989). 
60 Id. at 76. 
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A cmt. D. 
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to the Restatement, "Each communication of the same 
defamatory matter by the same defamer, whether to a new 
person or to the same person, is a separate and distinct 
publication, for which a separate cause of action arises."52 
Thus, one printing of an edition of a book, magazine, or 
newspaper is one communication, one call for attention. One 
broadcast of a television program, radio show or motion picture 
exhibition is one communication. However, a repeat broadcast, 
exhibition, printing or edition is an additional communication, 
is an additional call for attention, and thus permits an 
additional cause of action.53 By analogy, each time a 
defamatory message or report is accessed on a computer, it is a 
new communication, making a new opportunity for injury, and 
should warrant a new cause of action. 
III. THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED 
TO THE INTERNET 
The single publication rule applied to the print media 
should not extend to the Internet because the Internet is a 
more pervasive and permanent medium than print. Print 
media is evanescent. It generates a substantial impact at the 
time of publication, which quickly fades over time. In contrast, 
information stored on the Internet is potentially permanently 
available. Further, while it is difficult to eliminate print once 
it is in circulation, eliminating information on a website is 
practical, even easy to do. 
There is a remedy for defamation on the Internet not 
available with defamatory print materials. This remedy can 
and should be utilized. The size of the audience on the Internet 
each day is up to a thousand times larger than any single 
publication of print media.54 Information is assembled 
purposefully to reach wider and wider audiences so that 
exposure potentially increases over time. Easy access to 
information on the Internet promotes continuing or greater 
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A subs (1) cmt. 
63 740 ILCS 165/1 (West 1994). Dubinsky v. United Airlines Master Executive 
Council, 708 N.E.2d 44; N.M.S.A. § 41·7·1 (1996); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8341(b); 
41 A.L.R.4th 541 § 8. (1985). 
64 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 871. 
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impact over time, in contrast to the diminishing impact of the 
print media due to its decentralization after publication. 
An important difference between defamation in the print 
media and defamatory publication on the Internet is that, 
unlike print media, defamatory material is more easily 
removed from the Internet. Once a book, magazine or 
newspaper is printed and distributed, it cannot be easily 
removed from circulation. The damage of that printing cannot 
be curtailed by its elimination because it is virtually impossible 
to retrieve the defamatory material and destroy it. Therefore 
because courts cannot and do not require elimination of 
defamatory print material once it has been published, the 
courts permit only one action in liability. 
The Internet differs from print media because, once a 
defamatory piece is published on the Internet, a practical 
remedy is to eliminate it from continued circulation. One need 
only remove it with a click off its URL location. In this way, 
the Internet is more like a television broadcast, a radio 
broadcast or a motion picture exhibition. Once the court 
determines that a broadcast contains defamatory material, the 
defamatory material cannot be broadcast again without 
incurring renewed liability for defamation. 55 The decision 
maker need only refrain from re-broadcasting to avoid the 
liability. By failing to remove defamatory material, an Internet 
publisher theoretically makes a conscious decision to leave that 
material on the website daily.56 If the publisher has sustained 
his maximum liability when he fIrst publishes, he has no 
motivation to limit the harm. 
Printed matter is evanescent in its impact and existence. 
A week old newspaper is likely to have been thrown in the 
garbage, been used to wrap a fish, or committed to microfIche 
in the bowels of a library. Magazines have the same short life 
span, and books tend to fall out of public access by being 
secreted in the personal space of one user. An Internet 
document never fInds its way into the garbage except by the 
publisher's choice. Although one copy may become isolated to a 
single user's personal space, the document remains 
theoretically available to the public for an infinite period of 
55 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8341(b); 41 A.L.R.4th 541 § 8. (1985). 
56 Van BusKirk, 2000 WL 1206732 at 2. 
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time. The differences between print media and the Internet 
favor not extending the single publication rule to the Internet. 
Moreover, the single publication rule has never been 
extended to television, radio or motion pictures. 57 This is 
because it is understood that each subsequent broadcast has 
renewed impact and "is intended to and does reach a new 
audience."58 An Internet communication is similar to a 
television or radio broadcast. It has renewed impact with each 
viewing. Information on the Internet is intended to and does 
reach a new audience every minute of every day. Thus, the 
Internet is more like television, radio and motion pictures, with 
renewed prominence and new audiences each time it is 
accessed for viewing on the screen. 
Due to the sheer volume of users of the Internet, serious 
problems could arise if the Internet provided a permanent 
haven for defamatory material. One large book printing may 
constitute several hundred thousand copies. A defamatory 
book may not be reprinted again without incurring liability. 59 
Over time, single copies are stored on disc, microfiche, or kept 
on shelves in libraries, inaccessible except to those who 
specifically seek them out requiring motivation, time and some 
degree of physical labor. 
The number of web users each day is greater that an entire 
printing of a single newspaper, magazine or book. The 
Internet's great success is due to the fact that information is 
more easily accessible, available instantaneously, and requires 
minimal motivation and physical energy. A single document 
remains available on the Internet to forty million readers every 
minute.60 The likelihood of viewing by new persons increases, 
not decreases, over time, and therefore the ability to cause 
continuing damage is more likely. One need only e-mail the 
URL to defame an individual to a new party all over again. 
The potential damages resulting from the vast scope of 
information and accessibility of the Internet is currently the 
subject of litigation in other related areas of law. Previously 
57 Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 126, paras. 11 to 15 (Smith-Hurd 1987»; New Mexico 
(N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-7-1 to 41-7-5 (1986»; and North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE 14-
02-10 (1987»; Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8341 Notes (West Supp.1994». 
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A cmt. D. 
59 Dodd v. Harper & Bros., 3 App Div 2d 548 (1957). 
60 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 871. 
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unimaginable access to information requires new laws to meet 
the new realities of the Internet. For example, in Sony Corp. v. 
Universal Studio Inc., the United States Supreme Court 
permitted videotape copying of copyrighted television programs 
and movies for home use. The Court concluded that the Sony 
VCR was capable of significant non-infringing use and that 
Sony lacked the constructive knowledge that their customers 
would use their equipment to make unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted material.61 The Court refused to hold Sony liable 
for contributory copyright infringement for assisting the 
copying of copyrighted television programs and motion 
pictures.62 
However, the courts have treated downloading copyrighted 
material from the Internet differently. In A & M Records v. 
Napster, the district court concluded, and the 9th Circuit Court 
affirmed, that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in 
demonstrating that the defendant, Napster, an Internet-based 
service that provided a platform for downloading mp3 music 
files, was liable for contributory infringement of copyrighted 
songs on the Internet, even though the defendant's system was 
similarly capable of significant non-infringing uses.63 The 
court concluded that the defendant's Internet site had the 
capability to block access to the system by users that supplied 
infringing material to other users, and that they failed to 
remove infringing material from the system, thereby providing 
the "site and facilities" for direct infringement. 
The difference in holdings was based on a number of 
factors all unique to the Internet. First, the court addressed 
the fact that Napster's users transmitted the copyrighted music 
from one home to the next in an unending series of downloads. 
In contrast, Sony home VCR users typically make a single copy 
of a television program, which remains in their own home for 
their own personal use.64 The court stated, "The majority of 
VCR purchasers ... did not distribute taped television 
broadcasts, but merely enjoyed them at home."65 The video 
copy became decentralized material available only to the 
61 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studio Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). 
62 [d. 
63 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F. 3d 1004 (2001). 
64 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913. 
65 [d. 
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household, while the mp3 file was centralized and capable of' 
being passed on indefinitely.66 "Conversely, it is obvious that 
once a user lists a copy of music he already owns on the 
Napster system in order to access the music from another 
location, the song becomes 'available to millions of other 
individuals,' not just the original CD owner."67 
The court further pointed to the ability of Napster to 
remove copyrighted material once it was made aware of its 
existence. This was consistent with the court's ruling in 
Religious Tech. Ctr. u. Netcom On-Line Communication Serus. 
that held a computer system operator who learns of specific 
infringing material available on his system and fails to purge 
such material from the system would be liable for contributory 
infringement.68 
The court's distinction between the limited scope of home 
video taping and the vast impact of Internet-based 
downloading of music is instructive and suggests that Internet 
publications should be treated differently than traditional 
paper publications because of the magnitude and pervasiveness 
of Internet-located materials. The court's further focus on the 
ability to remove improper materials for the Internet is also 
instructive, for what cannot be remedied in a traditional paper 
publication is easily remedied on the Internet. 
Defamation does not contribute to meaningful public 
discourse. The volume, scope, and permanence of defamatory 
information on the Internet cannot be ignored, nor can the fact 
that potential remedies are available on the Internet that are 
not available for defamation in print media. Once a public 
report is no longer published in print, it goes from creating 
news one day to being forevermore removed from circulation by 
banishment to the bowels of a state legislative library. Today 
that public report, true or not, continues to be republished 
daily on the Internet, potentially damaging an individual's 
reputation for the rest of his or her life. If extended to the 
Internet, the Single Publication Act would contribute to 
making the Internet a safe depository for defamatory material. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 
1361, 1374 [N.D. Cal. 1995]. 
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Therefore, the Single Publication Act should not be extended to 
the Internet. 
Odelia Braun* 
• J.D. Candidate, 2002, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
California. To Eric, Adina, Elissa, Zack, and Sophie who support me unfailingly. 
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